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Abstract
Since Benoit Mandelbrot’s discovery of the fractal nature of financial price series, the quan-
titative analysis of financial markets has been an area of increasing interest for scientists,
traders, and regulators. Further, major technological advances over this time have facili-
tated not only financial innovations, but also the computational ability to analyze and model
markets.
The stylized facts are qualitative statistical signatures of financial market data that hold
true across different stocks and over many different timescales. In pursuit of a mecha-
nistic understanding of markets, we look to accurately quantify such statistics. With this
quantification, we can test computational market models against the stylized facts and run
controlled experiments. This requires both discovery of new stylized facts, and a persistent
testing of old stylized facts on new data.
Using NASDAQ provided data covering the years 2008-2009, we analyze the trades of
120 stocks. An analysis of the stylized facts guides our exploration of the data, where our
results corroborate other findings in the existing body of literature. In addition, we search
for statistical indicators of market instability in our data sets. We find promising areas for
further study, and obtain three key results.
Throughout our sample data, high frequency trading plays a larger role in rapid price
changes of all sizes than would be randomly expected, but plays a smaller role than usual
during rapid price changes of large magnitude (> .0.5% ∆p). Our analysis also yields
further evidence of the long term persistence in the autocorrelations of signed order flow,
as well as evidence of long range dependence in price returns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Financial markets are the cornerstone insitutions of a modern economy. By channeling
savings into investment, markets allow firms to accumulate capital, facilitate the transfer
of risk and liquidity, as well as expedite and promote international trade. While financial
markets maintain a complex relationship with the real economy, they can also exacerbate
economic instability and shake consumer confidence. More recently, due to a flurry of
financial innovations, financial markets have created instabilities within themselves which
can end up cascading outwards and negatively impacting the real economy (Brady 1988,
Kirilenko 2010).
In light of this, researchers in quantitative finance and econophysics have attempted to
identify key patterns in financial markets, both at an aggregate level and at the event level,
in order to better understand the social and technical mechanisms which drive markets.
Somewhat surprisingly, a handful of key statistical regularities have emerged from this
research, and these results have become what we now call the stylized facts.
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A second area of analysis which has come to light in recent years is the impact of high
frequency traders (HFT) on market behavior. HFT, or algorithmic traders, are computing
platforms that trade very quickly, immediately around the spread, and attempt to minize
risk as much as possible. That is, they do not generally attempt to move price, and their
net positions at the end of each trading day are close to 0. Due to the abilities of these
traders to place orders much more quickly than humans, the market impacts of HFT have
been brought to question. Recent studies have shown that the minimum time for a human
decision is on the order of one second, while HFT can place trades in under 25 milliseconds
(Johnson et al. 2013). Some have argued that because HFT are so active, they decrease
spread sizes and increase liquidity in markets, both indicators of a healthy market (Brogaard
et al. 2013, Hendershott et al. 2011). Others have argued that because neither human
traders nor regulators can follow high frequency trading in real time, it leaves markets more
vulnerable to market fractures, or large changes in price that happen in minutes, seconds,
or even milliseconds (Johnson et al. 2013, Wah 2013).
The Flash Crash of May 6, 2010 provides one example of a crash exacerbated by HFT.
The crash began on the E-Mini S&P 500, a futures index, where the price dropped 3% in
under 4 minutes. The effects quickly spilled over into equities markets, causing many HFT
to halt trading, which caused liquidity to dry up, and prices to drop to drop even further.
Prices eventually recovered, almost equally as quickly as they had fallen, after regulators
paused trading on the E-Mini for 5 seconds. While the primary causes of the Flash Crash
have been debated, there is no doubt among experts that the actions of HFT had a significant
impact on the events of that day (Kirilenko 2010).
2
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1.1.1 Literature Review
The two broad areas of study in the field of quantiative finance are empirical analysis and
computational modeling. While we carry out a purely empirical analysis in this paper,
we also emphasize the necessity of computational modeling as a tool in the pursuit of a
mechanistic understanding of financial markets.
Over 50 years ago, Mandelbrot first identified two major stylized facts in price data
which were robust across many different timescales (Mandelbrot 1963). These first two
stylized facts were fat tails and clustering volatility. Fat tails describe the distribution of
price returns, where the tails are “fat” because events of large magnitudes happen more
often than a Gaussian distribution would allow. Clustering volatility refers to the slow de-
cay of autocorrelations in the absolute value of price returns. Returns of similar magnitude
tend to follow one another, but those returns may be positive or negative. While Mandel-
brot’s model of fat tails has been shown to overestimate the occurance of large returns (Lux
2009), his findings have qualitatively held across different securities and markets.
There are various ways to calculate fat tails, but the most parsimonious is with the
kurtosis value of the return distribution. The kurtosis of the normal distribution is three. A
distribution with a kurtosis value of greater than three is called leptokurtotic and implies
that that both small and large price changes are more likely than a Gaussian distribution
would predict. Conversely, moderate sized price changes occur less often in a leptokurtotic
distribution. This is sometimes referred to as the distribution having a lack of shoulders.
Though many other stylized facts have been studied and described since then, contro-
versy surrounds many of them. Thus, we focus on just one more stylized fact in price data:
3
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the martingale property of price returns. This can be stated as
E[pt+1 | It] = pt
where It is information at time t, and pt is price. Thus, past returns do not yield predictive
power for future returns. This martingale property manifests itself as the quick decay in the
autocorrelation function of returns, and is the basis behind the efficient market hypothesis.
This property is also the basis of the efficient market hypthesis, which asserts that the
population of traders price expectations will be normally distributed around the ”correct”
market price, that is, the price reflected by the market.
The Hurst exponent is one way of measuring long-range dependence in a system. In
other words, the Hurst exponent measures how the range of the data scales over the number
of observations. We give the algorithm for calculating the Hurst in the Section 2.1.2. A
Hurst exponent of 0.5 is a purely brownian motion process, whlie a Hurst exponent greater
than 0.5 is an indication of positive correlations that persist for much longer than a true
martingale process would allow.
Recently, due to its increasing availability, a new type of data has been analyzed for
stylized facts: limit order book data. In order book and trade data, Toth and others have
observed persistent autocorrelations in signed order flow (Toth et al. 2011). That is, buy
orders tend to follow other buy orders, sell orders tend to follow sell orders, and these
correlations persist over moderate time lags. Toth introduces two simple explanations for
the persistence of signed order flow correlations. One possible explanation, which Toth
finds strong evidence for, is order-splitting, where one trader wants to buy or sell a large
amount of a security, and splits their order into many smaller orders placed closely together
in time. Another explanation, which Toth finds less evidence for, is herding. Although
4
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herding occasionally occurs in markets, especially during crisis events, it does not seem to
be the leading factor causing the correlations of signed order flow.
Timestamp Symbol Shares BuySell Price type
01-02-2008 09:31:51.924 BRE 48.0 1 40.31 HH
01-02-2008 09:36:08.129 BRE 3.0 1 40.05 NH
01-02-2008 09:36:38.054 BRE 10.0 1 39.83 NH
01-02-2008 09:40:19.737 BRE 7.0 1 40.02 HN
01-02-2008 09:40:20.016 BRE 80.0 -1 40.01 HH
01-02-2008 09:40:32.093 BRE 4.0 -1 40.0 NH
01-02-2008 09:41:36.017 BRE 4.0 -1 39.99 NH
Table 1.1: Example trade data of the stock BRE. A BuySell value of 1 indicates a buy
market order executed against a sell limit order, while a value of -1 indicates a sell market
order executed against a buy limit order. In the type column, H indicates an HFT, and N
indicates non-HFT. The first character corresponds to whoever placed the market order.
While many have built upon Mandelbrots foundational work, Cont (2001) provides a
comprehensive review of the current state of stylized facts research in financial price data.
The stylized facts, described above, have been shown to be robust across the price time
series of numerous markets and varying time intervals.
Together, this set of stylized facts provide empirical evidence to guide the validation
testing of market models. According to Cont, “... these stylized facts are so constraining
that it is not easy to exhibit even an (ad hoc) stochastic process which possesses the same
set of properties and one has to go to great lengths to reproduce them with a model”.
Recently, the focus in quantitative finance research has shifted towards the role of mar-
ket microstructure in price movements. To fully understand financial markets, we not only
need to understand how and why traders make the decisions they do, but we also need
to understand the structure of the order book on which they trade (Darley et al. 2001).
Computational modeling has offered some key insights into the ivmpacts of market mi-
crostructure. In particular, Farmer (2005) and Preis (2006) give examples of low intelli-
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gence agent based models which are able to reproduce the stylized facts of price data, but
not signed order flow. Meanwhile, LeBaron (2001) and Cont (2001) provide models with
more emphasis on trader decision making which also reproduce the stylized facts.
From an empirical perspective, Easley (2012) has developed the Volume synchronized
probability of informed trading (VPIN), a metric which attempts to measure informed vs.
non-informed trading. Yeo (2009) offers two examples of liquidity measures which make
use of the dispersion of orders in the book.
1.1.2 Data and Objectives
The analysis in this study was conducted on trade data supplied by NASDAQ from 120
hand-picked stocks. The trade data is at the tick resolution, covering all trades of the given
stocks in the years 2008 and 2009. There are over 550 million trades over all stocks during
this time. For each trade which was executed, the data contains a timestamp, a price, an
indication of buy or sell (of the market order), and an indication of the trader type (high
frequency or not) on both ends of the trade.
The objectives of this research are the following. In Section 2.1.1, we show how to
statistically evaluate the clustering volatility, kurtosis, and decay in autocorrelations. In
Section 2.1.2 we show how to calculate the Hurst exponent, and in Section 2.1.3 we show
how to calculate signed order flow autocorrelations. We show our method of analysis of
HFT in Section 2.2 in an attempt to identify patterns that correlate with market instability.
Following the work of Johnson et. al. (2012), we study the effect of HFT on market
fracture events, which we categorize as contributors to market instability. In Section 3.1.1,
we present an overview of the stylized facts for price, and present an analysis of cross-
correlations between stocks. Section 3.1.2 details our Hurst exponent results, Section 3.1.3
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shows the results of the signed order flow analysis. Section 3.1.4 discusses our study on
HFT and market fracture events, and our conclusions are included in Section 3.2.
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Methods
This research study was conducted in three phases. First we calculated stylized facts in the
trade data. These are important indicators which give us a very general sense for the type of
market behavior which occurred over the test period. Further, we perform a rescaled-range
analysis, and calculate the Hurst exponent. Last, we analyze the role of high frequency
traders in the data, and attempt to understand what market impacts these ulta-fast traders
may have.
2.1 Measuring the Stylized Facts
2.1.1 Price Series Calculations
For an index set of date times T , we have that the price series P = {pt | t ∈ T}. Note that
for tick data, T is an unevenly spaced index set, since financial transactions are governed
by event time, which is generally limited only by the technological capabilities of a given
exchange and the participating traders. If T is evenly spaced, we let ∆t be the time between
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events. Due to some complexities with unevenly spaced time series data, we resample
and linearly interpolate price tick data at the five minute (∆t = 5 minutes) and one hour
resolution (∆t = 1 hour). We also analyze daily and weekly close time series.
From the price series, we first calculate a return series
R = {rt = ln(pt+1)− ln(pt) | pt, pt+1 ∈ P} (2.1)
We then calculate kurtosis as γ2 =
µ4(R)
σ4(R)
, where µ4 is the fourth moment about the
mean, and σ is the standard deviation. Generally, in financial data over short time scales,
kurtosis values are greater than 5, with no strict upper bound. One important note is that
kurtosis is (quite clearly) nonlinear, thus the average kurtosis of the intraday return series
over a month will not be equal to the kurtosis of the entire month’s return series. In addition,
as ∆t grows very large, the distribution of returns will approach a Gaussian distribution (
γ2 ≈ 3).
Next, we calculate the autocorrelations for the raw returns series as well as the absolute
value return series up to a lag of 100 ticks. The efficient market hypothesis assumes that
returns are uncorrelated, so we perform a Student’s t-test, assuming a null hypothesis of
uncorrelated returns, and rejecting our hypthosis if the condition p < .05 is met.
The clustering constant is calculated as
C =
50∑
i=1
ACFi(|R|)
50∑
i=1
ACFi(R)
,
where ACFi is the autocorrelation function for a lag of i ticks. For the last step in calculat-
ing our price stylized facts, we assign each return series a score of 1 or 0, where a score of 1
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indicates that γ2 > 4, p > .05 in the Student’s t-test, and C > 3. A score of 0 indicates at a
failure to meet at least one of these requirements. These scores serve to give us an intuition
for the data, and should bring to light any unexpected behavior in our data.
2.1.2 Rescaled-Range Analysis
We perform an R/S analysis and calculate the Hurst exponent in the following manner
(Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004):
1. For a price series P with n samples defined above, we first calculate the mean m =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pt, and create a mean-adjusted price series Yt = pt −m for t = 1, . . . , n.
2. We calculate a series Z = {Zt =
∑t
i=1 Yi}, which shows us the cumulative devia-
tions from the mean at time t.
3. For each t, create a range-series Rt = max(Z1, . . . , Zt)−min(Z1, . . . , Zt).
4. Create a standard deviation series St = 1n
∑t
i=1(p − µ)2 where µ is the mean of the
series p1, . . . , pt
5. Now calculate R
S t
= Rt
St
for each t.
6. To calculate the Hurst exponent, plot R/S against n on a log-log plot and find the
slope.
A Hurst exponent between 0.5 and 1 indicates that an increase in prices will be followed
by another increase in the short term, and a decrease in prices will be followed by another
decrease in a the short term. It also indicates that in the long term, prices will not generally
revert to the mean. In contrast, a Hurst exponent between 0 and 0.5 indicates that in the
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short term, an increase in prices will be followed by a decrease, a decrease will be followed
by an increase, and price will tend to revert to its long term mean. For Hurst exponents
very close to 0.5, there is no correlation between past returns and future returns, which is
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis.
2.1.3 Trade Data Calculations
In the trade data, we draw from the work of Toth, Farmer and Lillo (2011), and measure
autocorrelations in the series of signed orders. A signed order is simply the direction of the
order, so a buy order = +1, and a sell order = -1. Thus, an autocorrelation measure on the
series of signed orders tells us how likely we can predict a future buy or sell based on a past
buy or sell. Farmer (2011) finds that signed orders decay as a power law with the lag time,
up to 3 orders of magnitude. Thus, one would have a much better chance of predicting the
sign of a future order based on past order signs than a future return based on past returns.
2.2 Analysis of High Frequency Trading
In the trade data, we look at the role of HFT in both taking and providing liquidity. We
examine three types of trades: Trades with HFT taking liquidity and non-HFT providing,
trades with HFT providing liquidity for a non-HFT taker, and HFT both taking and provid-
ing liquidity.
Also in the trade data, we calculate the impact of HFT on market fractures. When 10 or
more trades occur consecutively in the same direction, and the average time between trades
is less than 50 ms, we label the block of trades a market fracture. A large market fracture
occurs when the price changes more than 0.5% during a market fracture. To measure the
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impact of HFT during this phenomenon, we compare the proportion of HFT market orders
over the complete time series to the proportion of HFT market orders during both types of
market fractures. This measure is inspired by but not identical to work done by (Johnson
et al. 2013).
We also note that the trade data has instances of multiple trades with the same times-
tamp. Hasbrouck (2010) interprets orders sharing the same timestamp as a single market
order broken up over several smaller limit orders. For instance, if a sell market order were
placed for 1000 shares, and the limit order with the best buy price is of size 900, the re-
maining 100 sell market orders will be executed at the next highest priced limit buy order.
However, for blocks of trades with the same timestamp, NASDAQ reports all orders as
having been executed at the same price. Due to uncertainty over the curation of the data,
we run this analysis using the raw data provided by NASDAQ, and also by compiling all
orders with the same timestamp into a single market order.
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Results
3.1 Overview of Results
3.1.1 Stylized Facts
First we present a naive version of the stylized facts. The Figure 3.1 shows histograms of
kurtosis, clustering volatility, and autocorrelation decay for all stock over the 2008-2009
period. The plots for kurtosis and clustering volatility constants are calculated from returns
series with multiple ∆t values: 5-minute, hour, daily, and weekly.
For 5-minutes returns, 115 out of 117 stocks passed our stylized facts test, better than
98%. The only two failures were due to a lack of clustering volatility. For the hourly
returns, the return series for all 117 stocks passed the stylized facts test. For daily returns,
we find that 107 out of 117, or 91.4 % of stocks pass the stylized facts, with most failures
due to a kurtosis value which was not greater than 5. However, all kurtosis values for daily
returns were greater than 4, which implies they are not drawn from a Gaussian distribution.
13
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Figure 3.1: Stylized facts over different timescales
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Figure 3.2: As mentioned above, kurtosis is based on the 4th moment, and thus is highly
nonlinear metric. Tick returns, shown in (a) and (b) will have much higher kurtosis values
than minute, hour, or any lower resolution returns.
As the time between observations increases, and the number of observations decreases,
both kurtosis and clustering volatility tend to decrease. This result is corroborated by other
work in the field (Cont 2001), as over larger observation windows, returns tend to look
Gaussian. Thus, looking at monthly returns throughout history gives very little insight into
the occurance of market crashes or more generally, market volatility.
By looking at kurtosis at smaller timescales, we are able to get a sense of how volatility
in price changes over time. In Figure 3.2, we see a moving average of the kurtosis of
intraday returns, smoothed with a sliding window of 20 days.
Note that around October 2008, during the brunt of the crisis, mean intraday kurtosis
reaches record highs for the two-year period. While it is somewhat surprising that kurtosis
does not spike earlier during the crisis week of September 15, this is an average across all
stocks, so we may see the behavior we expect in some of the more highly traded stocks.
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INTC is the most highly traded stock during the 2008-2009 period, and below we see
how the moving average of kurtosis peaks during September 2008, and maintains well
above ”normal” levels for the next few months.
Kurtosis does not tell the whole picture regarding volatility of returns. We look next at
correlations between returns leading up to, during, and after September 2008. The follow-
ing figure details correlations of returns at the 5-minute level for the 20 most traded stocks,
for the week beginning on the day specified in the plot title.
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(b) July 7, 2008
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Figure 3.3: In these plots of correlations between 5-minute returns, the week of September
15 (c) stands out emphatically.
Immediately following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 14, lenders,
which included large investment firms and banks, issued margin calls to hedge funds and
other investors that they had lent money to. The investors who had to meet their mar-
gins had only a limited time to pay back the lenders, and thus had to start selling assets
immediately to collect enough capital to pay back lenders. As prices fell across the finan-
cial system, more investors failed to meet margins, the cycle of rapid selling continued,
and banks stopped lending, culminating in the financial crisis. This is highlighted in the
cross-correlations between returns in Figure 3.3.
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We run the same analysis with returns at the one hour resolution. Comparing Figure
3.3 and Figure 3.4, we note that correlations between returns at the one hour resolution are
not present at the minute timescale, nor indeed at any other timescale. This could be due to
random effects, and without doing further analysis on other financial data, we do not wish
to make any conclusions.
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Figure 3.4: Cross-correlations of returns at the one hour resolution are much stronger than
cross-correlations of 5-minute returns.
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3.1.2 Hurst Exponent
Next, we calculate the Hurst exponent for returns at the 5-minute resolution level. We split
the return series into 6 sets of return series: The first set consisted of the entire 2008-2009
series, which included 39815 observations at the 5-minute level. The next set consisted of
two return series, including 19907 and 19908 observations. The first of these contained all
of the 2008 returns, and the other contained the 2009 returns. We continued this process,
splitting each series up into halves and doubling the number of series in each set. The last
set of series contained 32 return series, each containing 1244 observations. We then follow
the steps outlined above (Rescaled Range Analysis).
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Figure 3.5: Rescaled range plots of 4 selected stocks
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Some of the subplots in Figure 3.5 are noisier than others, and we see that trend in BRE
and SWN. Since neither of these stocks are among the most traded, the noise is likely a
result of the data interpolation which we performed to get returns at the 5-minute level.
Both AA and GE are highly traded, and also have high Hurst exponents.
The average Hurst exponent across all stocks was calculated as 0.526 (median = 0.528),
which is not significantly different from a Brownian motion process, indicating that on
average, no long term memory was detected in stock returns. Note, however, the difference
in the following plots:
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Figure 3.6: The second figure is a histogram of only the 20 most traded stocks by volume.
The average Hurst exponent of these stocks is 0.538, which is slighty higher than the overall
average of 0.526, and the median is 0.549.
3.1.3 Signed Order Flow
We find extreme persistence in autocorrelations over large time lags in signed order flow.
While we make no claim about power law behavior of these autocorrelations, we do note
that the 90% confidence interval of log-log slopes is (-0.88,-0.44), and the r2 values for all
linear fits are greater than 0.7.
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Thus, the ability to predict future order flow from past order flow is much greater than
the ability to predict future returns based on past returns. As noted in Section 1.1.1, Toth
(2011) attributes most of this autocorrelation persistence to order splitting, the breaking
down of large orders into several smaller orders to reduce market impact. We test this
hypothesis against our fracture data below.
Note that these results are reported from the raw trade data (as described in Section
2.2), but the adjusted data results do not qualitatively differ. Figure 3.7 shows the fat tailed
persistence of signed order flow autocorrelations.
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Figure 3.7: Two example signed order flow autocorrelation plots. Almost all stocks had
the same break in scaling (ankle) which appears in (a) at around 101.1 lags. There was
no correlation between the total volume of a stock and the existence of the ankle in its
autocorrelation function, implying the ankle is not related to noise in the data. The ankle
shows that autocorrelations decay more quickly during the first order of magnitude than
over the rest of the data.
3.1.4 HFT Analysis
During the Flash Crash, over 70% of excecuted trades were exclusively between one HFT
and another HFT (Kirilenko 2010). Using our measures of fracture events in Section 2.2,
we measure the proportion of HFT in three types of trades: Trades with HFT as liquidity
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takers, and non-HFT providing liquidity, trades with HFT providing liquidity for non-HFT
takers, and HFT both taking and providing liquidity in a trade.
Thus we have that Total HFT Taking = HFT Taking Only + Both HFT, and likewise,
Total HFT Providing = HFT Providing Only + Both HFT.
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Figure 3.8: HFT makes its largest impact (as a proportion of trades) as a liquidity taker dur-
ing small adjusted fracture events. HFT makes up a smaller proportion of taking, providing,
and both during large adjusted fractures than it does in overall market activity.
HFT provided nearly 40% of all liquidity (in shares) over the 24 month sample period,
while taking nearly 50% of the liquidity. In fact, 18% of all trades and 15% of all shares
traded had HFT platforms on both sides of the trade.
In all of the blocks of raw fractures, over 37 million trades took place, or about 6% of
total trades. Adjusting our data as described in Section 2.2, we are left with under 4 million
uniquely timestamped trades that fit our criteria of fractures, about 0.6% of all trades made
in the dataset.
Using our adjusted data, HFT plays a larger part taking liquidity during fractures than
during overall trading. HFT acts as a liquidity taker in over 66% of the adjusted fractures
trades, compared to 50% of overall trades. However, in the raw data, HFT plays only a
slightly larger role in taking liquidity during fractures. Thus we have contradicting con-
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clusions based on the curation of the data, and further work will need to be done in this
area.
In contrast, looking only at large returns yields a clearer picture. HFT plays a smaller
role as a taker in trades that occur during both raw and adjusted fractures. This suggests
that extremely fast and moderately large price changes are not driven by HFT, but instead
by traders placing large orders that are split into pieces and executed very quickly in suc-
cession, as noted by Toth (2011).
Typically, order splitting occurs to reduce market impact. If trades are being placed
less than 50 ms apart, the trader who placed the order is not giving the market much time
to respond, thereby rendering the order splitting useless. One hypothesis for this behavior
could be that the trader is relying on HFT to provide liquidity in real time for the order, but
as we see in Figure 3.8(b), HFT liquidity providing during large fractures is either equal
to or less than overall HFT providing. Thus, HFT is not playing a major role in providing
liquidity for these trades. Once again, further research is needed in order to determine why
these blocks of trades are being placed and their impacts on market stability.
3.2 Conclusion
In order to further explore the statistical properties of financial data, we examined trade
data from 2008 to 2009 of 120 stocks. We conclude that during the 2008 Financial Crisis,
the mean kurtosis value across all stocks reached its maximum. Further, we find that cross-
correlations in 5-minute returns have little predictive power, but cross-correlations in hourly
returns may contain more information.
Our analysis of the stylized facts across different samplling periods yields results con-
sistent with previous work. In addition, we found some evidence of long range dependence
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in price returns in an examination of Hurst exponents. Last, we explored the phenomenon
of persistence in autocorrelations of signed order flow, and attempt to research a connection
between market fractures, signed order flow, and high frequency trading. We find that HFT
plays a smaller role in taking liquidity during large market fractures than in overall trading.
We leave the mechanism driving large market fractures as an open question. We point
to agent based modeling to answer these mechanistic questions, while also emphasizing
the necessity of further analyzing high resolution market data to guide computational ex-
periments.
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